Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of Caucasian Journal: Dear Lasha, thank you for your time. Organized crime is a troubling issue, but that should not deter us from addressing it. On the contrary, we must do so. International media reports frequently highlight Georgian involvement, we hear about deportations, and other related matters. I hope you will shed light on these topics for our readers. To start, I have a question: How did you become so deeply invested in this subject, leading to your dissertation?
Lasha BREGVADZE: I was only 22 years old during the Rose Revolution of 2003. That's when I was integrated into the law enforcement agencies. It was a tough time for Georgia. I was initially appointed as an investigator for special cases at the Ministry of Security, which was the name of the organization at the time. Later, I was transferred to the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice, where I took on the role of Head of the Financial Audit Division.
In 2006, the Penitentiary Department of Georgia underwent a major reform. I was nominated to the existing management of the department as a candidate because I was seen as a non-corrupt, young, and educated individual with experience in several successful reforms. Initially, I faced repeated rejections for the positions of director or deputy director at various penitentiary institutions (prison) due to my lack of experience in this field. Consequently, I was appointed as the head of a special service within the Penitentiary Department.
I was in charge of a team that tracked down escaped convicts. We had personnel stationed across Georgia and even around the world, working to catch them. I believed that serving in this capacity would allow me to study the criminal subculture and its leaders more closely and thoroughly. Just a few months later, I was appointed as the director of one of the prisons (I was only 25 years old at the time!)
This was a time when the country was undergoing significant reforms and changes, so my prison was a maximum-security facility designed for the most dangerous criminals, including those serving life sentences, organized criminals known as "observers" (смотрящие), and so-called "thieves in law" (воры в законе) [this term refers to a high-ranking figure in organized crime, similar to the Italian "don" - CJ].
It was around then that I started studying this complex subculture as one of the elements of hybrid warfare. But it wasn't until 2007, when I became the head of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense, and during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, that I really saw how dangerous this subculture was and how much damage it could do to a small country like Georgia.
AK: Why has organized crime related to Georgia become so prominent? What factors distinguish it from other ethnic criminal networks?
LB: As for the Georgian criminal subculture that's taken over top spots in European countries and around the world, that's mostly because of the growth of technology and the internet. I should also note that this subculture has always been quite powerful in post-Soviet countries, particularly in Georgia.
The Georgian criminal subculture did not emerge from a desire for wealth, but rather from a commitment to liberate their country and fight against an unjust Russian system. This dedication is what distinguishes it from other ethnic criminal subcultures in the post-Soviet space.
If you look at the percentages, more than 60% of the world's so-called "thieves in law" are Georgian citizens, including ethnic Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Yazidis, and Kurds.
If we were to create a list of the most influential "thieves in law," it would likely consist mostly of Georgians. This is a rather sad reality for me and for all reasonable citizens of Georgia.
This subculture started in Georgia during the Russian Empire period, and it was actually seen as a respectable profession back then. In Georgian culture, they were more romanticized, they were not perceived as criminals.
When this subculture first formed, people weren't into hurting anyone or making money. They were more into fighting against the unfair and oppressive system Russia has had going on for centuries in Georgia and the whole Caucasus region.
The Georgian criminal subculture did not emerge from a desire for wealth, but rather from a commitment to liberate their country and fight against an unjust Russian system.
This dedication is what distinguishes it from other ethnic criminal subcultures in the post-Soviet space
AK: What is the connection between criminal activities abroad, particularly in the EU, and those within Georgia? Is Georgia a central hub, or are these separate operations?
LB: Since Georgia was struggling financially after gaining its freedom, a lot of Georgian criminals tried to make "easy money" by emigrating to Russia first.
It always was seen as wrong for Georgia's "thieves in law" to steal from their own country and citizens.
After the Soviet Union collapsed and the Iron Curtain disappeared, they started looking at countries in the Schengen zone and other European countries.
It always was seen as wrong for Georgia's "thieves in law" to steal from their own country and citizens.
Law enforcement agencies from European countries are still struggling to deal with new and unknown types of criminal organizations. This type of subculture is a great challenge in countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, Poland, and neighboring Turkey.
This makes it easy for criminal groups from Georgia and their leaders to settle in Europe and make a lot of money.
This makes it easy for young people to travel abroad from Georgia and join these professional criminal groups. Young people are recruited from Georgia and get involved in criminal activities.
The connections between the criminal subcultures in Georgia and Europe are practically continuous, and they've never been severed.
Another keystone was the law adopted during the 2003 reforms. It says that being part of a criminal subculture, being in it, or being part of its highest ranks can get you in legal trouble. We based this law on the American RICO law [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act - CJ] and adapted it to fit Georgia's situation. The RICO Act was used to convict the Five Families of the New York Mafia, and their influence was reduced when Rudy Giuliani was district attorney. This law is probably one of the most effective deterrents against the presence of the highest members of that subculture and dangerous criminals on the territory of Georgia.
AK: What are the primary areas of interest for Georgian organized crime? Have these interests changed over time, and what are the current trends?
LB: The activities of Georgian criminals are largely similar to those of criminal organizations in other post-Soviet countries. They primarily engage in crimes such as robbery, extortion, and theft. Additionally, they extort money from the owners of large markets and shopping centers, offering "protection" services.
With the rise of the internet, their operations have become more sophisticated. They have started to involve themselves in the financial sector, purchasing shares in major financial organizations. They are also interested in microfinance institutions, where they engage in money laundering and participate in internet crimes such as phishing and operating fraudulent call centers.
Furthermore, they are drawn to large infrastructure and construction contracts awarded by the government.
To legitimize their illegal income, they invest in real estate, warehousing, and maritime and land transportation. They often set up companies throughout Europe to facilitate these investments.
AK: If you could provide any specific examples, that would be quite interesting.
LB: For example, in 2010-2025 special operations were conducted in Spain (Barcelona, Madrid), Italy (Naples, Palermo, Milan, Rome), Greece (Athens, Thessaloniki), and France (Paris, Marseille, Toulouse). Through these operations, several high-ranking figures of the Georgian criminal subculture were arrested as "thieves in law." As a result of these operations, a large amount of stolen goods, a large amount of illegally obtained money, and real estate valued at millions were confiscated, including villas and office buildings.
AK: Can we further discuss the geographical scope of these activities, specifically the specific countries or cities involved?
LB: After the Soviet Union fell apart, the most powerful gangs were based in Spain (Barcelona and Madrid), in Italy (Naples, Palermo, Milan), and Rome, in France (Paris, Marseille, and Toulouse), in Greece (Athens and Thessaloniki).
But now, with more money, they're getting into other European countries too. Right now, Poland seems like one of the most interesting and easy-to-take territories for this subculture. Just look at what happened a few weeks ago, when more than a thousand Georgian citizens were extradited from Warsaw.
Now, not all of these folks were criminals, but if we're talking about 10% of them, that's still a pretty significant number. And that's not even counting the five Georgian "thieves in law" living in Poland and doing their dark deals.
It's also important to mention that Georgian "thieves-in-law" have a strong presence in Turkey, especially in Istanbul, Antalya, and border cities with Georgia. From there, they spread their influence into Georgian territory.
AK: A very important question, in my view, is the impact on Georgia's international image. How would you assess the negative effects of organized crime on the country's reputation?
LB: Georgia's reputation on the global stage is a matter of concern, particularly in light of the Georgian Dream government's (GD) approach to combating criminal subculture since 2012.
The GD has adopted a liberal stance, often characterized by leniency in addressing this issue.
This approach has enabled the strengthening and expansion of the criminal subculture, facilitating the recruitment of new members from Georgia. This, in turn, reinforces the leadership of the Georgian criminal subculture, which has established itself in European countries, making its groups more powerful.
The European Parliament has repeatedly raised the issue of the Georgian criminal subculture and its highest-ranking members, mentioning that their activities have tarnished the country's image and weakened its reputation. Due to these activities, the issue of imposing certain restrictions on the country under visa liberalization has often been raised.
This highlights the significant challenges of Georgian criminal subcultures in Europe and their negative impact on Georgia's foreign reputation as a stable and democratic nation.
AK: Does this damage affect Georgia's investment climate or international relations?
LB: The criminal subculture's activities in Europe significantly impact Georgia's international relations. The Council of Europe has recently declared several issues that depend on Georgia's European integration. These include the strengthening of crime in the country and the presence of corruption in the government. Corruption is a tool used by the criminal world to conduct hybrid warfare.
A review of foreign investment inflows to Georgia since 2012 shows a clear decline. There have been no significant investments from European or South American countries since 2020. These statistics provide a definitive answer to the posed question.
The implementation of reforms in Georgia after 2003 led to a substantial increase in foreign investment, which was facilitated by the weakening and subsequent dissolution of the criminal subculture within the country.
AK: How effective are current anti-criminal efforts? Can you comment on the effectiveness of the anti-criminal efforts in place? Concrete examples would be appreciated.
LB: During the thirty years of Georgia's independence, all governments have attempted to implement successful and effective reforms to combat this subculture. However, these efforts have not yet yielded any final, effective results.
Let's discuss this issue and explore the reasons behind the lack of long-term results.
One of the primary challenges is the absence of a scientific approach to understanding and addressing this issue. Instead of analyzing existing results and developing a comprehensive strategy, governments have often implemented measures in a piecemeal manner.
Secondly, and most crucially, governments have approached this issue with inadequate preparation and an excessive use of force. A notable instance of this is evident in the governments of President Eduard Shevardnadze and the subsequent administration following the Rose Revolution, which sought to ad-dress the criminal subculture. During this period, laws were stringent, and a zero-tolerance policy for crime was declared. (For your information, I participated in these reforms, and in retrospect, I do not justify a lot of steps in the reforms at that time.)
Although these measures resulted in a temporary improvement in the situation, the government's approach following the 2012 elections, particularly its handling of criminal activity, has been harmful and has not had a positive impact on the country.
The Russian Federation is employing a hybrid warfare strategy against the global community, using its criminal subculture as a testing ground for these tactics, as demonstrated by its actions in Georgia.
A notable instance of this phenomenon can be observed in the 1990s when organized criminal groups operating in Georgia took the shape of "Mkhedrioni" - "National Guard Units". Notably, the upper echelons of these units often coincided with the highest positions within the government. Jaba Ioseliani, a former criminal figure and a "thief in law", held the role of a member of the Military Council, which was one of the highest ranks in the state during that time. Individuals with criminal backgrounds occupied prominent positions in law enforcement ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, the Information and Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Unfortunately, at this point, Georgia has lost all significant battles in the aforementioned hybrid war.
A potential strategy to address this challenge involves acknowledging the active involvement of the criminal subculture within the special services of the Russian Federation. The instrument and its classification must be elevated to the level of threats that directly jeopardize national security.
Until this is done, Georgia and other countries will continue to face challenges in this hybrid war.
AK: What steps must be taken to help eliminate this problem? As an expert, what recommendations can you propose?
LB: In my opinion, it is necessary to touch upon such a concept as one of the elements of hybrid warfare, such as the conduct of asymmetric warfare.
For example, the so-called "thieves' society" and subculture are inherently suitable as an important element of this type of warfare.
I will provide a list of recommendations aimed at maximizing the isolation and weakening of the mentioned subculture's influence on society. However, it is important to note that these recommendations do not guarantee complete success and must be updated regularly based on the evolving situation.
Since the early 2000s, a previously unknown type of warfare has emerged within the realm of hybrid warfare. In this context, the Russian Federation employs elements of the criminal subculture, including figures known as "thieves-in-law." This strategy targets various sectors of a country, including its economy, politics, military, and counterintelligence. The primary aim of this infiltration is to jeopardize national security and stability through irregular actions that reflect criminal behavior.
I suggest to carry out several regulations and changes, namely:
It is essential to implement both administrative and operational control over the leaders of criminal groups known as "thieves in law," as well as individuals who exhibit a "thief" mentality. We must also work to isolate schoolchildren from the influence of these individuals nationwide.
We need to establish special penitentiary institutions designed for individuals without a criminal history who have committed minor or less serious crimes. This will help separate them from repeat offenders.
To reduce the criminal environment across the country, we should consider decriminalizing certain minor offenses and transitioning them into non-custodial sentences.
Strengthening, diversifying, and more effectively regulating the country's financial sector will help limit corruption and the shadow economy.
We must protect the private sector and businesses from being undermined or absorbed by criminal subcultures.
Reforming the education system is crucial for safeguarding and promoting the healthy development of young people.
Lastly, regional and global cooperation among law enforcement agencies is necessary to create a unified system for the registration and control of criminal authorities and representatives of the "thieves" subculture.
AK: What message do you have for our readers, many of whom have international business interests in Georgia and the South Caucasus?
As for the message, I would like to convey to your readers, perhaps the most important one is that Georgia is, has been, and will always be a member of the great European family.
I would like to emphasize that Georgia, being a small and developing country with abundant natural resources and great potential, presents an excellent opportunity for foreign investment. If invested in, these resources can lead to rapid growth and expansion in a short period of time.
AK: Thank you very much!
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