12.09.2024 (Caucasian Journal). Our guest today is Dr. Václav ŠTĚTKA from Czechia, Associate Professor in Comparative Political Communication at Loughborough University in the United Kingdom. His new book discusses the increasing trend of illiberalism, polarization, and declining trust in mass media in Central and Eastern Europe.
How applicable are these trends to Georgia? Which European experiences can be particularly helpful here? Watch or read the expert's responses below.
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Dr. VÁCLAV ŠTĚTKA: “ILLIBERAL ACTORS COPY EACH OTHER’S PRACTICES”
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of CJ: Hello and welcome to Caucasian Journal video interviews. Our guest today is Dr. Václav ŠTĚTKA from Czechia, Associate Professor in Comparative Political Communication at Loughborough University in the United Kingdom. His new book published this year discusses the rise of illiberalism, polarization, and declining trust in political elites and mainstream media, focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. That sounds very relevant to our situation, but let's see… Welcome Václav, we have been looking forward to this discussion!
Václav ŠTĚTKA: Hello, and thank you very much for the invitation. I’m honored to be your guest.
AK: One of your book's main conclusions is that “the illiberal public sphere does not show any signs of weakening at a global scale”. To better understand this I must ask you to introduce to our audience what is an illiberal public sphere, and how does it correlate with mass media and polarization?
.jpg "The Illiberal Public Sphere")
VŠ: We have coined together with my co-author Professor Sabina Mihelj this concept of the illiberal public sphere to capture the communicative aspect of illiberalism. That's a term that most people are nowadays familiar with, I believe, and we define it as both an ideological universe – which means a system of certain values and beliefs – and a set of practices and institutional arrangements that attempt to undermine liberal democracy. So the core of illiberalism is guided by a vision of a society governed by majority rule and underpinned by ethno-nationalist ideals as well as traditional cultural hierarchies. It contributes to a gradual decoupling of democracy from constitutional liberalism, which some authors describe as leading towards democracy without rights. We define the illiberal public sphere as a communicative space that comprises media and communication channels, both new and old, that essentially promote and amplify illiberal actors, views, and attitudes. In our book we are describing the process through which the illiberal public sphere gradually colonizes institutions and systems that have previously served as a cornerstone of the liberal public sphere. We have basically established three ideal-typical stages of this illiberal public sphere: a processual model consisting of incipient, ascendant, and hegemonic stages of the illiberal public sphere.
In the first stage - the incipient one - the illiberal public sphere is rather fragmented, and we find it mostly on the fringes of the political and media system. Probably all democratic countries contain an element of this incipient illiberal public sphere, but the core characteristic here is that these institutions do not grow into the position of a mainstream.
According to our research, the Czech Republic is essentially positioned somewhere in between the incipient and ascendant illiberal public sphere. An example of the ascendant illiberal public sphere is Poland. That’s a country where – under the previous right-wing government – the illiberal public sphere has colonized some of the mainstream media channels, especially public service media, and illiberal actors are rising to power and capable of changing the regulatory environment; also, there is a significant process of mainstreaming of illiberal narratives.
Finally, there is this hegemonic stage of the illiberal public sphere, observed in Hungary or Serbia, where it essentially dominates, and the liberal public sphere and its institutions are in retreat - they are mostly pushed online. Illiberal narratives are prevalent in the public domain and are virtually uncontested; they are perceived as mainstream.
So these are ideal-typical stages. Most countries wouldn't fit neatly onto one or the other stage. It is best understood as a continuum, and it's a tool that we use to describe how the liberal public sphere gradually morphs and transforms into an illiberal one and potentially further down the road, because illiberalism is not necessarily the endpoint. The end-stage might be authoritarianism. We see traces of directions towards it in some countries of Eastern Europe.
AK: How aware are you of the situation in Georgia, and how do the tendencies that you describe apply to countries outside of your focus? Do you see Georgia as a part of the global illiberal trend?
VŠ: I cannot claim expertise in Georgian politics, I'm afraid, but I have been following the dramatic events this spring - especially the courageous protests of civil society against the proposed Foreign Agents Bill. I was really moved by the spirit with which the people of Georgia tried to defend democracy. They show their determination to pursue EU accession and to stop the adoption of this law which, as I understand, is really following the Russian playbook by undermining the institutions that serve as core pillars of a liberal democratic society, especially media, and which endangers the country's candidate status.
There has been a tendency by illiberal actors to form informal international networks and alliances, learning from and copying each other's practices, including those related to handling political and media opposition.
That's very concerning, and I'm curious about the upcoming October elections because it might be a turning point for Georgia - hopefully in the direction of democracy and pro-Western orientation.
The alignment of some political representatives with conservative and illiberal actors abroad is something we indeed observe in many other countries. There has been a tendency by illiberal actors to form informal international networks and alliances, learning from and copying each other's practices, including those related to handling political and media opposition.
I think the adoption of the Foreign Agents Bill is extremely concerning in this regard. I cannot comment on all aspects of the bill, but its impact on media is quite apparent: The law undermines independent journalism and attempts to stifle oppositional voices.
This is something we have seen in other countries, not just Russia. The attempt to impose restrictions on foreign ownership of media or foreign financial involvement in independent media has been observed in several European countries, including Hungary. Slovakia is considering going in this direction as well. Poland, under the right-wing illiberal government of the Law and Justice party, has attempted to impose similar restrictions on foreign ownership in Polish media. This was likely due to the strong liberal and pro-democratic orientation of some mainstream Polish media outlets, which were co-funded or co-owned from abroad.
So, this is following the same playbook that we might call Russian, but we have seen it in other countries. That’s why it is very important to analyze what's happening in Georgia within the broader global context of rising illiberalism.
The attempt to impose restrictions on foreign ownership of media or foreign financial involvement in independent media has been observed in several European countries.
AK: Let's move to media freedom and public trust. Judging from the Czech and other Central European countries experience, if Georgia's orientation towards EU remains unchanged, what are the likely prospects for media freedom and public trust in Georgia? In other words, can we encourage the public by promising a freer, more trustworthy media landscape? If not, what other benefits of EU membership can you highlight, that might influence decision-making at the ballot box?
VŠ: Judging by the scale and intensity of the protests against the Foreign Agents Bill, it's clear that people in Georgia understand the importance of defending media freedom. They know that this is an area that the EU is observing very closely, also in light of the newly adopted European Media Freedom Act. It is now part of the acquis communautaire, and therefore the candidate countries will be required to abide by its core principles. They will be required to demonstrate that they protect media freedom.
In other words, the future of Georgia's EU accession is significantly tied to the developments in the media sector. It's certainly not the only condition, but it is increasingly important in the eyes of the EU. Improvements in the media will likely facilitate an easier path towards accession. Especially with the framework governed by the European Media Freedom Act, there will be stronger instruments to preserve media freedom and independence for candidate countries as well.
AK: Maybe we shall devote a separate interview to the first results of the implementation of this Act?
VŠ: It's a milestone in the history of media regulation in the EU because there hasn't been any piece of legislation that has dealt specifically with media freedom and pluralism until now. We are all eager to see what happens, how this act will be implemented, and whether it will be successful.
AK: I liked your book also because it's academic and practical at the same time, as it provides recommendations, for instance for media professionals. Can you share recommendations that might be suitable to our current situation?
VŠ: In response to your question, I'll return a little bit to highlighting some of the main problems we've observed in CEE countries or factors that contribute towards the rise of illiberalism.
One of those factors is the increasing polarization. Both politics and media systems are becoming more polarized, partially driven by business interests or strategies, especially in countries with a significant independent and commercially driven media sector. As we know, polarization or partisanship quite often “sells”, so we recommend journalists and media organizations tone down their partisan biases and stick to traditional journalistic values like professionalism, impartiality, and factual correctness, fairness, and accuracy.
We have seen also in our interviews that people often reject or criticize the tendency of news media to become overly partisan or activist. This reduces their trustworthiness, fragments the public sphere, and creates so-called “echo chambers”, where people only believe their own sources, without being sufficiently confronted with the other side, and without being supplied with ideologically neutral information.
We also see as absolutely crucial the protection and preservation of the institution of public service media, a tradition that has served as the sort of political center of the media spectrum in many countries. Nowadays, we see this model diminishing gradually, and public service media are under pressure in many countries, including those where they have essentially stopped operating as public service broadcasters and become more or less mouthpieces for government propaganda, particularly in Hungary.
To dampen polarization and stop this spiral, it is essential to protect the independence of public service media. I know that this is very relevant in Georgia as well because, I believe, it was at the end of last year when the government proposed some changes to the system of funding for public service media. This proposal was heavily criticized. Instead of being funded by an agreed percentage of gross domestic product, the proposal attempted to fund the broadcaster by an annual fee, decided each year by the Parliament. This is quite risky and opens doors to undue political influence over the broadcaster. We have seen this in some other countries in Europe and beyond, and it's certainly not recommended.
So, the final point regarding our recommendations is the need for either the state or international organizations to help foster an economically enabling environment for independent journalistic outlets, thereby contributing to greater media pluralism. We also believe that this is particularly important for local and regional outlets, which are often not well-served by mainstream media. It is people in rural areas who often end up voting for populist or illiberal candidates because they are not provided with other quality information sources that could help them choose other alternatives.
The danger is that such attacks, including through this Foreign Agents Bill, are damaging the institution of journalism as such, not just the opposition.
AK: What do you expect from labeling mass media as foreign agents?
VŠ: We've seen this in other countries, including Hungary, and there are current attempts in the same direction by the Slovak government. We know that Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, has been extremely vocal about the alleged influence of actors such as George Soros. So, this is nothing new. It's a question of whether it will work in Georgia in the same way.
I think that in deeply polarized countries, which I believe Georgia is, the message will be received in a completely different way by supporters of the government and the opposition. The question is what about those who are still undecided, somewhere in the middle? There is a danger, that simply because of the sheer power of the government's propaganda machine, those people who previously had little opinion on these issues will be potentially swayed by this narrative and will be likely to distrust these media. They may be convinced that this is probably the case if the government says so.
So yes, it's a clear attempt to delegitimize independent journalism and oppositional voices in general. It's an attempt to further decrease trust in independent news sources. Unfortunately, with that, the overall trust in media gets attacked and diminished. So, that's the danger that such attacks, including through adopting this Foreign Agents Bill, are actually damaging the institution of journalism as such, not just those on the opposition side.
AK: I want to thank you very much for meeting with us. We really appreciate this opportunity and I hope we shall meet again.
VŠ: The pleasure was mine and I would definitely love to follow up on this conversation at some point, especially following the outcomes of the Georgian elections in October, which, as I mentioned, will be crucial not just for Georgia, but for the region as well, and for the EU indeed.
AK: I think it was an excellent discussion. You are always welcome at the Caucasian Journal.
VŠ: Thank you very much for the invitation.
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