13.10.2025 (Caucasian Journal). Today, Caucasian Journal is pleased to welcome Dr. Sebastian SCHÄFFER, Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) in Vienna, Austria — one of Europe’s oldest and most respected think tanks, dedicated for over 70 years to fostering cooperation, research, and dialogue across Central and Eastern Europe.
▶ ქართულად: The Georgian version is here.
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Sebastian SCHÄFFER: “THE BEST WAY TO PRESERVE FREEDOM IS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION”
Alexander KAFFKA, editor-in-chief of CJ: Today, CJ is pleased to welcome Dr. Sebastian SCHÄFFER, Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) in Vienna, Austria. Welcome to Caucasian Journal, Sebastian! You are the head of this Vienna-based think-tank, studying Central and Eastern Europe for many years. How can you introduce IDM to our viewers and readers today?
Sebastian SCHÄFFER: First of all, thank you very much for the invitation. It's a great pleasure to talk to you today, and I'm very honored that we have this possibility. If I would briefly describe what we are doing - we are centered around what we call “5 P's”. Out of these P's the most important is our Platform. We work with 19 different countries in the wider Danube region, and we have institutions that we work together.
Furthermore, our second P is our Publications. We have various formats of publications, policy papers, a scientific journal, a science communication journal.
And with this, we try to fulfill part of our mission, which is also to inform the broader public about what is happening in our target region. And we do this with our third P, which is our Public Events. We organize around 50 per year - closed door summer schools, but also open seminars and discussions where we invite the broader public to discuss pressing matters.
The fourth P is our Projects. One of the specialties that our institute is doing is EU enlargement for both enlargement regions - the Western Balkans and the former Eastern Partnership Associated Trio that includes also Georgia by extension, although we all know that the situation currently is not very pro-EU integration in the country, unfortunately.
And the last one is our Policy Analysis - the expertise that our team has. We have a small, but very dedicated team. Everyone tries to write op-eds, give interviews like this and reach out across borders to keep the conversation going that we think is very vital.
AK: I have a connected question about the think tanks in general. In your view, what's the impact of the think tanks on the practical policies today?
SS: It's hard to measure how such an impact is happening, because most of the times you try to steer a conversation and bring ideas into the conversation that is ideally sold to decision-makers as if they would have come up with it. So the best way is to present something as if it would have been their idea.
There are no easy benchmarks to measure this. But I think within the exchanging of ideas, you can see that there is a certain impact. What we have done at IDM, where I consider us having had a certain contribution was, for instance, the question of the Schengen integration of Bulgaria and Romania. As you know, Austria vetoed their accession two years ago. And we, together with the Romanian and Bulgarian embassies,tried to make cases why it would be time for them to join Schengen. Ultimately, you know that they are now full Schengen members. I'm not claiming that we have done this. But I think the role of think tanks is to bridge that gap between certain decisions that are made and maybe the assessments of impact from different actors, be it the society, but also be it diplomacy.
AK: Now, we are representing the South Caucasian region. So my next question is how do you see this region from the heart of Europe? While, for instance, the Georgians identify themselves strongly with Europe dating back to the Golden Fleece, and the Armenians go to the times of the Bible, the view from the Europe might be really different. How is our region really perceived from Vienna and from EU?
SS: This is this is a very relevant and good question, but very difficult to answer because I think there are many answers to that.
In general, there is a lack of understanding of the history of those countries. Although we have neighboring countries, we know far too little about the culture and the traditions that shape the perception in those countries, and that, of course, by extension gets even less when we go to the South Caucasus. So, for instance, what you mentioned the biblical meaning of today's Armenia, I don't think that a lot of people in Austria are aware of that.
And it's very sad that we don't have the understanding of the broader European history, because Georgia’s history has an influence on our everyday life, even if we don't see that. Austria is also a dominant wine country, while the history of wine-making comes from Georgia!
Having worked in all three South Caucasus countries, I know how some parts of especially Armenian and Georgian societies had a desire for closer ties with EU. When I started to study, the Rose Revolutionhappened in Tbilisi, which shaped my overall perception. I even wrote my Magister thesis on the “color revolutions”.
I'm absolutely not an expert, but I think we forget this more than two decades’ struggle to get closer to the EU. And we tend to ignore this, until something puts it on the table, and most often this is some bad thing. We see that in Ukraine, and also in Georgia, unfortunately.
AK: Georgia is still the only country from our region to receive EU candidate status. We are all witnessing this strong internal struggle here between pro- and anti-European forces. Many observers say that Georgia has already missed its historical window of opportunity to join the EU. What do you think about the European attitude - will it be shaped by fatigue and reluctance regarding our region and Georgia in particular? Or would Armenia, for example, become actually the new “locomotive”, and shift places with Georgia?
SS: Let me say first of all, I deeply regret this development, because I think the Georgian society has fought for two decades to receive that candidate status. And then suddenly this window of opportunity opened. They got it, and then immediately stopped by the political side to seize this moment.
And this is something that I deeply regret. That doesn't mean that it is over: There's always an opportunity, and it's good that they used the possibility to apply and receive the status. This is something that is there, and you can build from that.
It's going to be harder for Armenia to get there. Even if they maybe are more determined from a political side, it will be hard to receive a candidate status. I don't think there will be a momentum for them anytime soon, because what we see currently in the discussion is a shift towards “Can we actually do that, are we ready?”
There are a lot of countries, including Austria or Czechia, that have been in favor of enlargement traditionally, since joining the EU. But now the latest Eurobarometer shows that in these countries and others as well, there is no majority in favor of enlargement anymore. And that is paradoxical because I think the momentum for enlargement has not been that good in the past two decades.
This shows a gap between the political will from the side of the European Commission and the different developments in the EU societies, and this gap is widening. There is not a simultaneous progress with regards to European enlargement and a lack of communication why it's actually beneficial to have EU enlargement. We are heading towards a cliff because when Ursula von der Leyen promised the candidate status to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and they received it, this was a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. And it's absolutely the right direction.
But this promise is given, and there will be countries that will deliver. I'm seeing this in the will in Ukraine, just like in Georgia, and the will in Moldova is there. They can do that politically. The will in other countries of the Western Balkans is there. We will arrive at the situation that there will be countries fulfilling the acquis communautaire. And then the EU member countries will have to decide - will we let them in, or not?
This will be a unique situation, because if they are refusing to let a country in, even if they fulfill the criteria (and we have seen that with Schengen, for instance, when Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled the criteria, but they still were not let in), and if we arrive at this situation when it comes to EU enlargement, I'm afraid this is the end of EU enlargement - because what would be the incentive to do all these painful demanded reforms, if you cannot be sure that if you do fulfill all the criteria, you are actually admitted into the club?
This will happen in the next couple of years. And I don't think we are ready for this situation.
AK: Speaking about the candidate countries, we cannot miss Moldova, especially as you have recently returned from observing the parliamentary elections there. Reports about the fairness of those elections are rather mixed. What are your personal impressions from that visit? And how would you assess the Moldova's democratic progress and current prospects of EU integration?
SS: This is, again, a very good question, but we need to look at different layers.
I was in Chișinău on Election Day, but we were also in Rîșcova which is a smaller village 40 kilometers from the capital. Of course, there's a very different. In Chișinău on Sunday, there was electoral silence, there are no billboards, no advertisements, but there were people on the streets heading to the polls, and there were even people carrying signs “Go to vote”. In the village, they have different priorities, need to take care of the agriculture etc. You would not know that there is an election going on.
In the capital, there was a tension, but not as high as in 2024, when I was also there at the presidential election. Then they were much more nervous because there was also the EU referendum. It was not about EU integration, but about adding to the Moldovan constitution that the European integration was the goal of Moldova. People were nervous that if the vote would be against it, that would be the end of the integration process.
It was much more important that the parliament has a solid majority of pro-European parties, than this referendum. But the tension was different, and people had a different feeling to it. That was interesting, because I think the parliamentary vote was much more decisive.
It surprised everyone that the ruling party of President Maya Sandu, Party of Action and Solidarity, won again an absolute majority, which enables them now to progress into European integration. They don't have to have a coalition partner. And this was not necessarily because the people wanted to vote for PAS, but they wanted this pro-European path and there was no alternative. There was not a promising EU integration party on the ballot that would make it into parliament. And this is also a danger because it gives a monopoly to PAS. And here I come to the question of the electoral integrity.
There have been allegations now, especially from the opposition parties, that PAS tried to hinder the people that live in the Transnistrian region to participate in the election - because they closed bridge crossings and did not provide that many polling stations. But the major point here is that they need to provide electoral integrity and they cannot give polling stations into a region over which they de facto don't have control.
Sebastian SCHÄFFER: First of all, thank you very much for the invitation. It's a great pleasure to talk to you today, and I'm very honored that we have this possibility. If I would briefly describe what we are doing - we are centered around what we call “5 P's”. Out of these P's the most important is our Platform. We work with 19 different countries in the wider Danube region, and we have institutions that we work together.
Furthermore, our second P is our Publications. We have various formats of publications, policy papers, a scientific journal, a science communication journal.
And with this, we try to fulfill part of our mission, which is also to inform the broader public about what is happening in our target region. And we do this with our third P, which is our Public Events. We organize around 50 per year - closed door summer schools, but also open seminars and discussions where we invite the broader public to discuss pressing matters.
The fourth P is our Projects. One of the specialties that our institute is doing is EU enlargement for both enlargement regions - the Western Balkans and the former Eastern Partnership Associated Trio that includes also Georgia by extension, although we all know that the situation currently is not very pro-EU integration in the country, unfortunately.
And the last one is our Policy Analysis - the expertise that our team has. We have a small, but very dedicated team. Everyone tries to write op-eds, give interviews like this and reach out across borders to keep the conversation going that we think is very vital.
AK: I have a connected question about the think tanks in general. In your view, what's the impact of the think tanks on the practical policies today?
SS: It's hard to measure how such an impact is happening, because most of the times you try to steer a conversation and bring ideas into the conversation that is ideally sold to decision-makers as if they would have come up with it. So the best way is to present something as if it would have been their idea.
There are no easy benchmarks to measure this. But I think within the exchanging of ideas, you can see that there is a certain impact. What we have done at IDM, where I consider us having had a certain contribution was, for instance, the question of the Schengen integration of Bulgaria and Romania. As you know, Austria vetoed their accession two years ago. And we, together with the Romanian and Bulgarian embassies,tried to make cases why it would be time for them to join Schengen. Ultimately, you know that they are now full Schengen members. I'm not claiming that we have done this. But I think the role of think tanks is to bridge that gap between certain decisions that are made and maybe the assessments of impact from different actors, be it the society, but also be it diplomacy.
AK: Now, we are representing the South Caucasian region. So my next question is how do you see this region from the heart of Europe? While, for instance, the Georgians identify themselves strongly with Europe dating back to the Golden Fleece, and the Armenians go to the times of the Bible, the view from the Europe might be really different. How is our region really perceived from Vienna and from EU?
SS: This is this is a very relevant and good question, but very difficult to answer because I think there are many answers to that.
In general, there is a lack of understanding of the history of those countries. Although we have neighboring countries, we know far too little about the culture and the traditions that shape the perception in those countries, and that, of course, by extension gets even less when we go to the South Caucasus. So, for instance, what you mentioned the biblical meaning of today's Armenia, I don't think that a lot of people in Austria are aware of that.
And it's very sad that we don't have the understanding of the broader European history, because Georgia’s history has an influence on our everyday life, even if we don't see that. Austria is also a dominant wine country, while the history of wine-making comes from Georgia!
Having worked in all three South Caucasus countries, I know how some parts of especially Armenian and Georgian societies had a desire for closer ties with EU. When I started to study, the Rose Revolutionhappened in Tbilisi, which shaped my overall perception. I even wrote my Magister thesis on the “color revolutions”.
I'm absolutely not an expert, but I think we forget this more than two decades’ struggle to get closer to the EU. And we tend to ignore this, until something puts it on the table, and most often this is some bad thing. We see that in Ukraine, and also in Georgia, unfortunately.
AK: Georgia is still the only country from our region to receive EU candidate status. We are all witnessing this strong internal struggle here between pro- and anti-European forces. Many observers say that Georgia has already missed its historical window of opportunity to join the EU. What do you think about the European attitude - will it be shaped by fatigue and reluctance regarding our region and Georgia in particular? Or would Armenia, for example, become actually the new “locomotive”, and shift places with Georgia?
SS: Let me say first of all, I deeply regret this development, because I think the Georgian society has fought for two decades to receive that candidate status. And then suddenly this window of opportunity opened. They got it, and then immediately stopped by the political side to seize this moment.
And this is something that I deeply regret. That doesn't mean that it is over: There's always an opportunity, and it's good that they used the possibility to apply and receive the status. This is something that is there, and you can build from that.
It's going to be harder for Armenia to get there. Even if they maybe are more determined from a political side, it will be hard to receive a candidate status. I don't think there will be a momentum for them anytime soon, because what we see currently in the discussion is a shift towards “Can we actually do that, are we ready?”
There are a lot of countries, including Austria or Czechia, that have been in favor of enlargement traditionally, since joining the EU. But now the latest Eurobarometer shows that in these countries and others as well, there is no majority in favor of enlargement anymore. And that is paradoxical because I think the momentum for enlargement has not been that good in the past two decades.
This shows a gap between the political will from the side of the European Commission and the different developments in the EU societies, and this gap is widening. There is not a simultaneous progress with regards to European enlargement and a lack of communication why it's actually beneficial to have EU enlargement. We are heading towards a cliff because when Ursula von der Leyen promised the candidate status to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and they received it, this was a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. And it's absolutely the right direction.
What would be the incentive to do all these painful demanded reforms, if you cannot be sure that if you do fulfill all the criteria, you are actually admitted into the club?
This will be a unique situation, because if they are refusing to let a country in, even if they fulfill the criteria (and we have seen that with Schengen, for instance, when Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled the criteria, but they still were not let in), and if we arrive at this situation when it comes to EU enlargement, I'm afraid this is the end of EU enlargement - because what would be the incentive to do all these painful demanded reforms, if you cannot be sure that if you do fulfill all the criteria, you are actually admitted into the club?
This will happen in the next couple of years. And I don't think we are ready for this situation.
AK: Speaking about the candidate countries, we cannot miss Moldova, especially as you have recently returned from observing the parliamentary elections there. Reports about the fairness of those elections are rather mixed. What are your personal impressions from that visit? And how would you assess the Moldova's democratic progress and current prospects of EU integration?
SS: This is, again, a very good question, but we need to look at different layers.
I was in Chișinău on Election Day, but we were also in Rîșcova which is a smaller village 40 kilometers from the capital. Of course, there's a very different. In Chișinău on Sunday, there was electoral silence, there are no billboards, no advertisements, but there were people on the streets heading to the polls, and there were even people carrying signs “Go to vote”. In the village, they have different priorities, need to take care of the agriculture etc. You would not know that there is an election going on.
In the capital, there was a tension, but not as high as in 2024, when I was also there at the presidential election. Then they were much more nervous because there was also the EU referendum. It was not about EU integration, but about adding to the Moldovan constitution that the European integration was the goal of Moldova. People were nervous that if the vote would be against it, that would be the end of the integration process.
It was much more important that the parliament has a solid majority of pro-European parties, than this referendum. But the tension was different, and people had a different feeling to it. That was interesting, because I think the parliamentary vote was much more decisive.
It surprised everyone that the ruling party of President Maya Sandu, Party of Action and Solidarity, won again an absolute majority, which enables them now to progress into European integration. They don't have to have a coalition partner. And this was not necessarily because the people wanted to vote for PAS, but they wanted this pro-European path and there was no alternative. There was not a promising EU integration party on the ballot that would make it into parliament. And this is also a danger because it gives a monopoly to PAS. And here I come to the question of the electoral integrity.
There have been allegations now, especially from the opposition parties, that PAS tried to hinder the people that live in the Transnistrian region to participate in the election - because they closed bridge crossings and did not provide that many polling stations. But the major point here is that they need to provide electoral integrity and they cannot give polling stations into a region over which they de facto don't have control.
And the second allegation was that they only opened two voting stations in the Russian Federation and you only have 5000 ballots per voting station. So only 10000 votes could be cast in the Russian Federation, whereas there have been 278000 votes cast in total by the diaspora. It's clear that the majority in Russia would vote for pro-Russian parties, and the majority in the West would probably vote for Maya Sandu, which the results clearly show.
And the diaspora vote saved Maya Sandu's presidency, the referendum and also the absolute majority. But again, if you want to preserve the electoral integrity, and this is also something that I learned from talking with official electoral observers, this is a necessary measure and the overall election was free and fair. And ultimately, I don't see there is any substantial claim to challenge the integrity of the Moldovan elections. Quite the contrary.
I need to add that now there are allegations against one of the parties that made it surprisingly into parliament, the Democracy at Home Party, which was not showing up in the polls, but then boosted through TikTok - quite similar to what happened in Romania. Coincidentally, they are cooperating with the unionist forces in Romania, the nationalist forces there, and made it into parliament.
The Electoral Commission is now looking into illegal boosting of that party through social media and evaluating if they will ban it. And I think this would be a wrong move, even if it's legally correct. I think this will drive more people into conspiracy theories that there was election hampering.
And the most influence, also money-wise, came from the Russian Federation, or through an oligarch called Ilan Shor. There were allegedly 200 million dollars poured into the country - around a percentage of the GDP of the whole country - to finance vote buying. But the Moldovan authorities learned from 2024, and they managed to prevent this. How did they do this? The police sent the ones that were discovered that they sold their votes in 2024 a letter, and they had to appear at the police station. They were not fined, not jailed, but they were told that this is illegal. And that prevented a lot of vote buying. A lot of money went into the pockets of Moldovan oligarchs, but not to the voters.
I think, this is a success for democracy in Moldova. And I hope they can continue with this story. It was a very interesting experience.
AK: Indeed, it’s very valuable information for all the readers. This drives me to questions about the future of European Union. When we talk about EU integration, the discussion often revolves around the laws and institutions. Will you agree that the essence is deeper? I mean the values, the identity and the ability of societies to build the trust in democratic systems. And if this is true, does the erosion of democracy within some EU member states pose a danger to the union as a whole in the future?
SS: Absolutely. I think we only tend to realize what we have, when it's gone. And we could see that with, for instance, free movement within the EU, when the Covid pandemic hit. The things we take for granted that are taken away are only missed when they no longer exist. And there is a huge danger because these demagogues and authoritarians try to tell that you will be better off without the EU, that we can do it much better on our own and we will save our nation and whatsoever… We've been there. We've done that. It didn't work. The European Union has flaws, and we need to criticize the EU and hold them accountable, but there is no better alternative out there, and we will not be better on our own.
But it's going to be hard to tell the people in Moldova: “Hey, go out and vote and do that path” or even worse, tell the people in Georgia: “Yeah, continue to go on the street, risk your lives and risk being imprisoned and face consequences”. Or even worse than that, tell the Ukrainians: “Yes, fight on the battlefield for the freedom and lose your lives and defend our freedoms.” And then at home, we have parties winning elections that want to dismantle these freedoms.
And we have not managed in over seven decades of European integration to really find this common resilience against this disinformation that is coming again. Let's debate about how to make it better, but dismantling it, undermining it will not be the solution. And it saddens me that we are not able to better communicate at home what those people in Moldova, in Georgia, in Ukraine, in the Western Balkans are striving for and dying for. And this is not an exaggeration; it's a fact, unfortunately.
AK: You often speak about the future scenarios for Europe. If we fast forward to, for instance, a year 2030, what kind of Europe do you imagine, and where do you see countries like Georgia or Moldova fitting into that picture?
SS: When we develop scenarios, we normally look at best case, worst case, and what realistically might happen.
In best case, we will see by 2030 new members joining. We will have countries like Moldova, Montenegro, Albania, but maybe even North Macedonia, Ukraine joining because they have the will. Ideally, there is also a certain development in Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and also in Georgia that that would enable a future membership. I don't see it happening until 2030, but with the other countries, I could see it.
And as a side note, we did an analysis last year at IDM and the average period of the successful negotiations for EU enlargement were 3,5 years. So it's doable to finalize negotiations. Joining and ratifying, that's a different process and takes longer, but it might be possible.
The worst case is what I described a little already. We might have countries that fulfilled the criteria, and we cannot get every country to sign the accession treaty. And that will be the end of EU enlargement as we know it. And I think this ultimately would also be the end of EU integration, and then the authoritarianism has won.
Realistically, I see that there is progress towards EU enlargement, maybe one or the other country even joining. But it will be a huge effort on both sides.
That's a big task in the next five years until 2030 to really get a majority of the population behind EU enlargement, explain better why this is the right way, why this makes sense while remaining critical at the same time. So realistically, I see that there is progress towards EU enlargement, maybe one or the other country even joining. But it will be a huge effort on both sides.
We might end up with new member countries because we have the longest period of non-enlargement in the history. And it's time to end this.
And we might end up with new member countries because we have the longest period of non-enlargement in the history. And it's time to end this, at least for the one or the other country.
AK: Thank you very much. If you feel like adding anything, the floor is yours.
SS: Thank you very much again for the invitation and great questions. I really appreciate the work that you are doing and I would just say to the readers - support the Caucasian Journal wherever you can! They do great and necessary work, and I think this is more critical than ever to achieve what I just described. Thanks a lot, and best regards from Vienna.
AK: Thank you, this is really appreciated!
▶ ქართულად: Read or watch the Georgian version here.
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